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Abstract
The paper analyzes the link between financial constraints and firms’ export decisions,
using a large micro-level data set on French manufacturing firms over the 1996–2004 period.
Our main finding is that firms enjoying better ex-ante financial heath are more likely to
start exporting. This results contrasts with the previous empirical literature which found
evidence that participation to exports market improves a firm financial health but not that
export starters display specific ex-ante financial advantages. By contrast, our result supports
the view that financial constraints act as a barrier to export participation. This finding has
important policy implications as it suggests that, in presence of financial markets imperfec-
tions, public intervention can be called for to help efficient but financially constrained firms
to overcome the sunk entry costs into export markets and expand their activities abroad.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the link between firms’ export decisions and financial constraints on a large
scale longitudinal micro-level dataset. We use as our theoretical background the recent models
of firm’s heterogeneity and international trade which emphasize the role of sunk entry costs
into export markets (Baldwin, 1988; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Melitz, 2003)1. Once extended
to allow for imperfect capital markets, those models offer to financial variables a key role as a
determinant of firm export decisions (Chaney, 2005). Indeed, the existence of sunk entry costs
into export markets brings about the question of the financing of such expenditures that, by
their very nature, are not matched by contemporaneous receipts. In the presence of financial
market imperfections, It may well be —and this is the main research question from which we
start— that exporters are those firms who can successfully overcome this financial problem. In
fact, this would be consistent with the evidence of exporters outperforming non exporters in
several dimensions as shown in the large literature triggered by Bernard and Jensen (1995).
On the other hand, existing empirical literature suggests that exporting may have a beneficial
effect on financial constraints, essentially in the form of reducing informational asymmetries by
means of some sort of signalling effect or in the form of reducing risk by the diversification
benefit of selling in multiple nations (Ganesh-Kumar et al., 2001; Campa and Shaver, 2002).
The positive impact of export participation on financial health has found its strongest support
in a recent contribution by Greenaway et al. (2007) (GGK afterwards). This paper provides
the first attempt to evaluate to which extent the self-selection and the ex-post effects drive
the correlation between financial variables and firm export decisions. However, the empirical
investigations ends up with only support in favor of the ex-post effects.
In what follows we present a new attempt to evaluate the relative importance of self-selection
and ex-post effects based on a large panel of French manufacturing firms over the 1996–2004
period. We add on the previous literature by two main respects. First, we propose a new way to
measure the degree of financial constraint, base on time-varying, continuous, multidimensional
indexes of the access to external finance, which we believe is superior to existing methodologies;
second, we shed new light on the role played by access to external financial resources in shaping
firms export decisions.
We can summarize our main findings as follows: First, the relationship between financial
variable and export decisions is mainly driven by the negative impact of financial constraints
on the decision to start exporting. Second, firms starting to export display a significant ex-
ante financial advantage compared to their non exporting counterparts. Third, we do not find
significant evidence of any signalling or diversification benefit effects after entry into the export
1The assumption that entry into foreign markets involves large sunk costs is supported by an expanding
empirical literature (see, amon others, (Bernard and Wagner, 2001; Das et al., 2001; Tybout, 2001; Bellone et
al., 2006)
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market. This is to say that firms that start serving foreign markets do not improve their financial
health as a consequence of exporting. Finally we show that the reasons why our study end up
with opposite conclusion compared to the previous literature involve both measurement issues
and methodological concerns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next Section presents an overview of the
empirical literature on financial constraints and how they relate to exporting behaviors. Section
3 presents our data and the different measures of financial constraints that will be used in the
paper. In Section 4, we present the results of different estimations on the relationship between
financial constraints, export decisions, and export status. Section 5 draws the main policy
implications of our analysis and concludes.
2 A glance at the existing literature
Since the late 1980s a large number of empirical studies have addressed the issue of financial
constraints, mainly in order to study the relation between firms investment and the availability
of internal funds. Indeed, a large and convincing evidence exists showing that when a standard
investment equation is augmented with cash flow availability, the fit of the equation is improved.
Now, under perfect capital markets, internal and external sources of financial funds should be
perfectly substitutable (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), so that the availability of internal funds
should not affect investment decisions.
While there is a substantial consensus on the notion that liquidity does matter in investment
equations, much less agreement exists on why this is the case. Chirinko and Schaller (1995)
suggest two possible hypotheses: the existence of financial constraints (due to the existence of
either asymmetric information or transaction costs), and mere mispecification whereby liquidity
takes up the effect of other omitted variables. In particular, contrasting empirical evidence exists
on the notion that investment responsiveness to cash-flow implies the existence of financial
constraints.
2.1 Measuring financial constraints
The usual empirical strategy adopted to detect the existence and the relevance of financial
constraints entails segmenting the sample into subgroups of firms with different likelihood of
facing financial constraints. Thus for instance, Fazzari et al. (1988) claim that firms with low
dividend payout ratios (likely constrained) display higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. A
number of subsequent studies tend to find supporting evidence using a number of different
variables to identify constrained firms (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Gilchrist and Himmelberg,
1995; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995).
The first paper finding opposite results is, to the best of our knowledge, Devereux and
Schiantarelli (1990) which reports a higher cash flow coefficient for larger firms, even after
3
controlling for sector heterogeneity. But it is only with the work by Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
that the usefulness of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraint has
been definitely questioned. Exploiting qualitative information from financial statements of firms
classified as constrained in Fazzari et al. (1988), the authors show that firms appearing as less
constrained display substantially higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. Hence, they conclude,
the latter can no longer be regarded as a useful measure of financial constraint. Since then, other
authors have reported evidence of a negative relation between investment-cash flow sensitivity
and financial constraints (for instance Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Cleary, 2006).
To overcome the weakness of the degree of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of
financial constraints, alternative strategies have consisted in placing firms in two different groups
on the basis of some arbitrary threshold such as median values, or first quartiles (Devereux and
Schiantarelli, 1990; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Greenaway et al., 2005; Cleary, 2006).
Other authors use a finer classification and classify firms in three or more groups (Fazzari et
al., 1988; Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Almost all the papers rely
on a limited list of variables such as size, age, dividend policy, membership in a group or
conglomerate, existence of bond rating, and concentration of ownership. All these variables are
ment to capture source of informational asymmetries that can potentially constrained access
to capital markets. So, for instance, Fazzari et al. (1988) claim that dividends are a residual
decision in firms strategy and, under the assumption that external finance is more costly than
internal funds, paying high dividends in presence of profitable investment opportunities is not
consistent with profit maximization. Hence, high dividend payout ratios signal the absence of
financial constraints. Big and mature firms are likely to find easier access to external funds as
it should be easier to collect information on them compared to young and small enterprises.
Similarly, membership in a larger conglomerate should facilitate market access both because of
the signaling exercised and because the single firm can likely receive funds from its headquarter.
Also, the mere existence of a bond rating (even irrespective of the rating itself) can signal a
commitment of the firm vis-a`-vis financial markets. In a similar vein the existence of a dominant
shareholder is seen as a way to reduce agency problem with management and therefore to act
as a guarantee toward external investors. Other papers, namely Becchetti and Trovato (2002)
and Savignac (2006), use survey data whereby firms themselves give a self-assessment of their
difficulty to access external financial funds.
There are a few weaknesses related to the above strategies. First, Hubbard (1998) notes
how most of the chosen criteria tend to be time invariant whereas one can imagine that firms
switch between constrained or unconstrained regimes depending on overall credit conditions,
investment opportunities and idiosyncratic shocks. Second, all works relying on dividend pay-
ments are restricted to quoted firms which, at least for what concerns continental Europe, tend
to be large and mature. As a further potential problem, we add that all the above studies rely
on a unidimensional definition of financial constraint, i.e. they assume that a single variable
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can effectively identify the existence of a constraint, and the latter is viewed as a clear-cut
phenomenon that is either in place or not, without allowing for different degrees. Notable ex-
ceptions are the works by Lamont et al. (2001), Cleary (1999, 2006), an Whited and Wu (2006).
The first paper builds a multivariate index that builds on Kaplan and Zingales (1997) whereby
five variables are weighted using regression coefficients in the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) paper
and collapsed into a single indicator.2 The main difficulty with this approach is the need to
extrapolate results obtained on a small sample of 49 US quoted firms (those used in Kaplan
and Zingales, 1997) and apply them to a larger population (and in a different period). Fur-
thermore, one of the variables needed to compute the index is Tobin’s Q, whose use as a proxy
for investment opportunities is rather controversial and lies at the core of the investment-cash
flow debate outlined above. Whited and Wu (2006) take a similar route but perform their own
estimate and base their index on a structural model whereby they measure financial constraints
by means of the shadow price of capital.3
Another interesting attempt to develop a time-varying, continuous measure of financial
constraints is due to Cleary (1999), which uses multiple discriminant analysis (in a way similar
to Altman, 1968) to compute a score based on six variables.4 The methodology entails two steps:
first one needs to classify firms as constrained or unconstrained according to some characteristic,
second the statistical analysis is performed which delivers a coefficient for each of the (six)
control variables.5 The score is then obtained as the predicted value of the empirical model,
and it can be applied also to firms excluded from the first step of the analysis. To separate
firms Cleary (1999) makes the hypothesis that firms reducing dividend payments one year to
the next, are likely to be financially constrained, whereas those augmenting them are likely
not to be constrained. Firms keeping dividend payment constant are not used in the multiple
discriminant analysis, but later they are nonetheless attributed a score.6
2.2 Financial constraints and export decisions
In presence of imperfect capital markets, one can figure out at least two rationales of why
exporting firms should be less financially constrained than non exporting firms: one stressing
2The variables are (i) cash flow to fixed assets, (ii) market to book ratio, (iii) debt to total assets, (iv) dividends
to fixed assets, and (v) cash to fixed assets.
3The variables included in the model are (i) the ratio of long-term to total debt, (ii) a dividend dummy, (iii)
sales growth (both for the individual firm and the sector), (iv) (the log of) total assets, (v) the number of analysts
following the firm, (vi) the ratio of liquid to total assets, (vii) the industry debt to assets ratio.
4There are (i) the current ratio, (ii) the debt ratio, (iii) the fixed charge coverage, (iv) the net income margin,
(v) sale growth, and (vi) slack over total assets. See Cleary (1999) for a definition of the variables.
5This is very much similar to what a probit or a logit estimation would do. In fact, multiple discriminant
analysis is nothing more than an ancestor of these methodologies, which, because of current computer power, are
probably preferable as more robust .
6An obvious requirement of this methodology is working with quoted firms. In principle one could then derive
a score for non quoted firms as well, but it is not clear how well the index would then behave.
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the link going from financial constraints to export behaviors, the other assuming that causality
runs in the opposite direction.
First, if firms have to incur large sunk entry costs to enter into export markets, financially
constrained firms may be less able to cover those costs compared to unconstrained firms. this
implies that only less constrained firms will be able to start exporting. This simple idea is
formalized in Chaney (2005) which adds liquidity constraints to a model populated by hetero-
geneous firms differently engaged in international trade (a` la Melitz, 2003). His model echoes
the growing set of evidence according to which a large part of trade barriers take the form of
fixed costs which must be paid up-front. A growing body of empirical literature documents
significant hysteresis effects associated with firms’ export participation and interprets this as
signalling the relevance of sunk entry costs.7 In the business literature, Moini (2007) reports
results form a survey among US non exporters, where firms claim their primary obstacle to
initiate an export program is the presence of high up-front costs.
Second, the very fact of exporting can generate an advantage in terms of access to external
financial funds. This can be rationalized in different ways: (i) exporting firms may generate
more stable cash flows, as they benefit from international diversification of their sales (Campa
and Shaver, 2002); (ii) selling in international markets can be considered as a sign of efficiency
and competitiveness by domestic financial markets, so that exporting lowers the informational
asymmetries that lie behind financial constraints (Ganesh-Kumar et al., 2001); (iii) foreign
exchanges revenues may represent a better collateral to access external funds in foreign financial
markets (Tornell and Westermann, 2003).8
In particular, Campa and Shaver (2002) postulate a link going from exporting to financial
constraints: exporters, their arguments goes, enjoy a more stable flows of revenues because
they sell their products in markets whose business cycles are not perfectly correlated. Also,
exporting being associated with better performance, firms engage in international activities
send a reassuring signal about their ‘type’ to the market. Both these effects should grant
easier access to external finance to exporting firms. Empirically, Campa and Shaver show
that investment is less sensitive to cash flow for the group of always exporters compared to the
group of never exporters. Considering next the remaining group of firms which shift their export
7See Roberts and Tybout (1997) for Colombia, Bernard and Wagner (2001) for Germany, Campa (2004) for
Spain, Bernard and Jensen (2004) for the US. Das et al. (2001) go one step further and estimates a structural
model to quantify sunk costs. They conclude that entry costs into export market are substantial.
8It is noticeable that, in specific economic environments, the fact of exporting can generate a disadvantage in-
stead of an advantage in terms of financial health. For instance, Espanol (2003) works with a panel of Argentinean
firms and she documents an inverse relationship whereby exporting firms are those facing larger constraints. She
argues that this can be explained by the specific macroeconomic context of the 1990’s in Argentina: the appre-
ciation of the currency which followed financial liberalization may have triggered a profit squeeze for exporting
firms, and weakened their balance sheet (diminishing both sales and asset accounts). As a consequence, not only
it reduced internal finance but also increased the probability of bankruptcy, therefore reducing banks’ willingness
to lend to exporting firms.
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status during the period of investigation, they show that financial constraints are more binding
for those firms when they do not export compared to when they do export. Nonetheless, the
Campa and Shaver (2002) results suffers from a few shortcomings. First, in using the sensitivity
of investments to cash-flows, Campa and Shaver are directly confronted to the Fazzari et al.
(1988) critic which casts strong doubt on the usefulness of this financial constraints measure.
Second, if both the diversification and the signalling channels were important, one should observe
a positive correlation between the share of firms’ foreign sales and their ability to overcome
financial constraints. Hence, export intensity rather than export status should be the most
influential determinant of a reduction of the constraint, but Campa and Shaver fail to find such
a relationship. finally, as they do not control for firm-level heterogeneity in productivity, they
cannot rule out the possibility that an independent change in productivity cause altogether the
decision of exporting and the lessening of the financial constraints.
In a recent paper, Greenaway et al. (2007) propose a more accurate assessment of the
relationship between financial constraints and export decisions. Working with a large scale
panel of UK manufacturing firms over the 1993-2003 period, they explicitly test for the causality
running between the two variables. Improving on Campa and Shaver in the way they measure
financial constraints (actually using a segmenting variable —the liquidity ratio or the leverage
ratio— instead of using the sensitivity of the firms’ investments to cash-flows), they conclude
in favor of the causality running from export to financial health. In other words, they find
no evidence in favor of the self-selection hypothesis but strong evidence in favor of ex-post
effects. However, the way GGK identify financial constraints also raises some issues as the
authors select, among a number of financial variables used to identify the constraint, those that
better discriminate among exporters and non exporters. Therefore, they risk ending-up with a
built-in relation between their index of financial constraint and the probability of becoming an
exporter.9
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data sources: the EAE survey and the DIANE database
We use data from two main sources. Both of them collect information on French firms, though
their coverage is somehow different. The first (EAE ) is a survey that gathers information from
the financial statements and balance sheets of all individual manufacturing firms with at least
20 employees, from 1990 to 2004.10 Each unit is endowed at birth with an identifying number
9The details on the choice of the variables used to measure the degree of financial constraints faced by the
firms are not presented in Greenaway et al. (2007) paper but have to be found in a companion paper (Greenaway
et al., 2005).
10The survey (Enqueˆte Annuelle d’Entreprises) is conducted by the French Ministry of Industry. The surveyed
unit is the legal (not the productive) unit, which means that we are dealing with firm-level data. To investigate
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that allows us to track the firm over time. The second source of information is the DIANE
database published by Bureau van Dijk, which collects data on over 1 million French firms for
the period 1996–2005. This database provides us with many financial stock variables absent
from the EAE survey. Merging the two datasets yields around 83,000 firm/year observations,
stemming from an unbalanced panel of over 12,500 manufacturing enterprises followed over the
period 1996–2004.11
3.2 The index of financial constraints
The way financial constraints are measured is a very sensitive issue in the literature which
investigates the link between financial variables and firms’ investment decisions. Measurement
issues may be important as well in the new literature on the relationship between financial
variables and firms’ export decisions. In this paper, we propose to confront four different
measures of financial constraints.
The two first indexes are the liquidity ratio and the leverage ratio.12 Both measures inform
about the general financial health of a firm but may have some weakness as an index of financial
constraints as they rely on a single variable to classify firms ex ante. In other words, they are
unidimensional measures of financial constraints.
Therefore, we also rely on indexes which attempt to collapse information coming from dif-
ferent variables which convey important information relative to the existence of financial con-
straints. The indexes are built following the methodology initially proposed by Musso and
Schiavo (2007) (which in turn build on Cleary, 2006). The 7 variables chosen to enter into the
indexes are selected on the basis of their performance in existing studies, and their perceived
importance in determining ease of access to external financial funds. They are: size (measured
by total assets), profitability (return on total assets), current ratio (current asset over current
liabilities ), cash flow generating ability13, solvency (own funds over total liabilities, measuring
the ability by a firm to meet its long-term financial obligations), trade credit over total assets
and repaying ability (financial debt over cash flow).
For each of these 7 dimensions, and each year, we first compute the value of the firm
relative to the average of all firms belonging to the same 2-digit NACE sector, and then place
it in one of the quintiles in which the resulting distribution is divided.14 Hence, for each
the role of financial constraints on growth and survival, firm, rather than plant level data seem appropriate.
11Chirinko and Schaller (1995) note that focusing on manufacturing only —as it is often done in the literature—
may exaggerate the role played by financial constraints because of the specialized nature of the assets involved
with those firms.
12The liquidity ratio is defined as the firm’s current assets minus its short-term debt over total assets, and our
leverage ratio as the ratio of the firm’s short-term debt to current assets.
13This is the maximum amount of resources that a firm can devote to self-financing, and corresponds to the
French capacite´ d’autofinancement.
14To account for the presence of outliers we trim the top and bottom 0.5% observations for each variable.
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firm/year observation we end up with 7 scores ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 containing the smallest
values. This information is then combined in different ways to obtain a synthetic index, which
is then rescaled to have a common 1–10 range, with smaller values being associated with more
constrained firms. In what follows we concentrate on two ways to combine the information: (i)
a simple sum of the 7 scores (Score A); (ii) the number of dimensions for which the firm/year
lies in the first or second quintiles (Score B)15.
The correlations between these four measures of financial constraints are presented in Table 1
below. It is noticeable that unidimentional measures and multidimensional ones, while positively
correlated, clearly encompass different information. On the other hand, the liquidity ratio
displays almost the same information than the leverage ratio as do Score A compared to Score
B.
[Insert Table 1 here]
3.3 Measures of firm productivity
In what follow, we compute Total Factor Productivity (TFP) using the so-called Multilateral
Productivity Index first introduced by Caves et al. (1982) and extended by Good et al. (1997).
This methodology consists of computing the TFP index for firm i at time t as follows:
lnTFPit = ln Yit − ln Yt +
t∑
τ=2
(
ln Yτ − ln Yτ−1
)
−

N∑
n=1
1
2 (Snit + Snt) (ln Xnit − ln Xnt)
+
t∑
τ=2
N∑
n=1
1
2 (Snτ + Snτ−1) (ln Xnτ − ln Xnτ−1)
 (1)
where Yit denotes the real gross output of firm i at time t using the set of N inputs Xnit,
where input X is alternatively capital stocks (K), labor in terms of hours worked (L) and
intermediate inputs (M). Snit is the cost share of input Xnit in the total cost. 16 Subscripts
τ and n are indices for time and inputs, respectively. Symbols with an upper bar correspond
to measures for the reference point (the hypothetical firm), computed as the means of the
corresponding firm level variables, for all firms, in year t. This methodology is particularly well
suited to comparisons of within firm-level panel datasets across industries in that it guarantees
the transitivity of any comparison between two firm-year observations by expressing each firm’s
input and output as deviations from a single reference point.
15We have tried also other ways to combine the information, with identical results. Additional details are
available upon request.
16See Bellone et al. (2008) for more details on the method and a full description of the variables.
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3.4 Descriptives Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for different types of firms present in the dataset: those
which always export (Continuous Exporters) during the whole period, those which do no export
initially but become exporters between 1993 and 2004 and continue to export ever since (Export
Starters), and those concentrating exclusively on the domestic market (Never Exporters).
[Insert Table 2 here]
Consistently with the literature on export and productivity, we observe a clear ranking be-
tween exporters and non-exporters. Specifically, firms which export (either continuous exporters
or export starters) tend to be larger, more efficient and less financially constrained than never
exporting firms.17
The largest gaps are between the continuous exporters and the never exporters, whereas
the difference between starters and never exporters is much smaller (apart from average pro-
ductivity). On average, firms belonging to the former group are 27% times more liquid (and
their leverage ratio is 11 % lower) than non-exporting firms. In terms of our Credit constraints
indexes (Score A et B), the ranking of continuous exporters is respectively 7% and 6% higher.
It is also noticeable that our four financial constraints measures offer a consistent ranking. For
each index, on average, continuous exporters are less financially constrained than export starters
which themselves are less financially constrained than never exporters.
4 Empirical Results
We start our econometric analysis by investigating the role of financial constraints in determining
the probability of exporting next period. In this inquiry, all types of exporting firms (namely,
continuous, starters and switchers) are pooled altogether. We then restrict our sample to export
starters and never exporters in order to investigate further causality issues.
4.1 The probability of exporting
We regress the probability of exporting in time t as a function of the degree of financial constraint
in t− 1. We use a large number of controls, including lagged size, wage, and productivity along
with industry 18 and year dummies. Specifically, we estimate:
17Remember that our Scores measure ease of access to external finance so that larger values imply a lower
constraint.
18Firms are allocated to one of the following 14 industrial sectors: Clothing and footwear; Printing and pub-
lishing; Pharmaceuticals; House equipment and furnishings; Automobile; Transportation machinery; Machinery
and mechanical equipment; Electrical and electronic equipment; Mineral industries; Textile; Wood and paper;
Chemicals, Metallurgy, Iron and Steel; Electric and Electronic components
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Expdumit = a0 + a1 Very smalli(t−1) + a2 Smalli(t−1) + a3 Mediumi(t−1)
+ a4Largei(t−1) + a5Wagei(t−1) + a6TFPi(t−1) + a7Subsidiariesi
+ a8Finconsti(t−1) + industry + time+ it
(2)
where the subscript i indexes firms and t, time. Expdum is a dummy variable equal to 1
if firm i exported in year t, and 0 otherwise. V erysmall (respectively Small to Large) is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i’s real assets in t are in the first quintile (respectively
in the second to the fifth quintile. Very large is the omitted category. Wage is equal to the
ratio of the firm’s total wage bill to the number of hour worked, TFP is our index of relative
productivity (see, Subsection 3.3). Subsidiaries is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
has subsidiaries, and 0 otherwise. Finconst denotes alternatively each of our four measures of
financial constraints: Liquidity ratio, Leverage ratio, Score A, and Score B.
In order to check the robustness of the coefficients on financial variables, we present the re-
sults obtained from two different estimators: a Random-Effects Probit estimator, and a Fixed-
Effects Linear Probability Model. Moreover, we run the estimations for each of the four al-
ternative financial constraints measures. Finally, we augment the initial Equation 2 with, as
an additional control, the lagged dependent variable. This dynamic specification allows us to
take into account hysteresis in export market participation. We want to investigate if, once
hysteresis is controlled for, the degree of financial constraints in t−1 still impact the decision of
exporting in t. For the dynamic specification, we also run two different estimations: a dynamic
Random-effects Probit model and a dynamic Fixed-Effects Linear Probability model. We end
up with two tables, table 3 and table 4, respectively for the static specifications and for the
dynamic specifications.
[Insert Table 3 here]
[Insert Table 4 here]
For each estimation, all control variables are significant and display the expected sign. In
particular, the size dummies are larger in absolute value for the smallest firms, indicating that
smaller firms are less likely to export than larger ones. The wage and productivity variables
have a positive effect on the probability of being an exporter, consistently with the fact that
exporting firms tend to pay higher wage and to be more efficient. Firms with subsidiaries (either
at home or abroad) are more likely to export, suggesting some additional motive for exporting
of those firms even after controlling for their other favorable characteristics.In the dynamic
specifications, the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are high and significant while
the value the coefficients on each of the other controls decreases. Nonetheless, each coefficient
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still displays its expected sign and is significant. This means that, whatever the current export
status of the firm, its contemporaneous characteristics still impact its future export decision.19
In comparison, the evidence on the impact of the financial variables are more mixed. On the
one hand, each of the unidimentional measures (the liquidity ratio or the leverage ratio) displays
the expected sign and is significant. In other words, good financial health (high liquidity or
low leverage) in t− 1 increases the probability of being an exporter in t. Moreover, this results
still holds in the dynamic specifications 20. On the other hand, the multidimensional financial
constraints indexes (either Score A or Score B) do not produce consistent results with the
liquidity or leverage ratios. In neither of the 16 estimations, do Score A or Score B display a
positive and significant coefficient.
At this stage, our results cast some doubts on the effectiveness of the link between financial
variables and the decisions to export: if multidimensional indexes are more reliable measures
of financial constraints than unidimentional ones, one should be concerned by the fact that the
coefficient on Score A et B lose their significance when controls are included in the regressions.21
This could indicate that financial markets are efficient enough for financial constraints not
impacting the export decisions of firms.
However, another possible explanation is that financial variables do not impact in the same
way on continuous exporters and export starters. Suppose, for instance, that financial con-
straints only impact the decision to start exporting but have no additional impact on the ex-
port decisions of established exporters. Hence, it is possible that the coefficient of our financial
constraint index is not significant in the overall sample because of a sort of composition effect.
To specifically investigate this hypothesis, we relate our financial constraints indexes to the
firm decision to start exporting. We want to check whether only those firms that are relatively
less constrained can afford to pay the sunk entry cost in export markets and therefore start
seeling abroad.
To do so we proceed in two steps. First, we examine whether future exporters have an
ex-ante financial advantage compared to non exporters. Then, we provide a formal analysis of
the decision to start exporting.
4.2 The ex-ante financial advantage of future exporters
As a preliminary issue, we investigate whether future exporters display an ex-ante financial
advantage over their non exporting counterparts, namely firms belonging to the same industry
19That is to say that, among today exporters, large firms which pay high wage and which display relatively
high productivity are still the more likely to pursue exporting tomorrow.
20Once more, the coefficients on both ratios are lower than in the static specifications but they are still
significant. This means that among today exporters, the more liquid (less leveraged) firms are still the more
likely to pursue exporting tomorrow.
21We indeed checked that without size, Wage and TFP as control variables, Score A and B display significant
coefficients with the expected positive sign. These results are available upon request.
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and share similar characteristics in terms of size and efficiency. We use a specification adapted
from the standard Bernard and Jensen (1999) methodology. We consider the group of firms
which start to export between 1999 and 2004. We then compare their degree of financial
constraint with the one of their never exporting counterparts. The comparison is done one and
three years before entry into the export markets. Specifically, we estimate:
lnFinconsti,t−s = α+ βExportdumit + γZi,t−s + dummies+ εit (3)
where Finconst is alternatively one of our four measures of financial constraints, Exportdum
is the dummy for exporter status, and Z a vector of controls that comprises Size (as measured
by Employment), productivity (TFP ), profitability (operating income over total assets), and a
set of industry-year dummies.
It must be emphasized that Equation 3 does not test for a causal relationship. It rather
allows to evaluate the strength of the pre-entry premium —i.e. to see to what extent firms
that export in time t were already less constrained some times prior the entry— by means of a
simple t-test on the significance of the β coefficient. Results are presented in table 5.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The coefficient of the export dummy is positive and significant in almost all cases, backing
the idea that before entering into foreign markets, future exporters enjoyed easier access to
external financial funds. One year before, export starters are around 36% less constrained than
their non exporting counterparts (in terms of Score A or Score B). The financial advantage of
future exporters is less pronounced in terms of the liquidity ratio and of the leverage ratio. This
results is consistent with the idea that liquidity and leverage ratios, even though they inform
on the financial heath of a firm, may be less consistent indexes of the ability of a firm to access
external finance than multidimentional indexes as Score A and B.
We performed the following robustness tests. First, we run the same regressions excluding
switching firms from our sample. This implies eliminating all firms that do start exporting
during the period under consideration, but do not continue to serve export markets ever since.
Hence, we reduce the number of entries into foreign markets to “successful entries” only. Results
are presented in table 9 of Appendix A: the estimated coefficients are lower but, in almost all
cases, robust to the change of sample. Second, we implemented the specification which led
GGK to reject the self-selection hypothesis for their UK dataset.22 Results are presented in
Table 12 of Appendix B. We end up with results very consistent with the previous literature.
Indeed, implementing the GGK empirical strategy leads us to reject the hypothesis that futures
exporters displays an ex-ante financial advantage over non exporters. This leaves us with the
22Indeed, we wonder to which extent the discrepancies between the results presented by GGK and ours are
driven by differences in the datasets, by the financial variable used, or by the empirical strategies.
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issue of which specification should be preferred? In our view, specification 3 has one main
advantage: it investigates the ex-ante financial advantage at different points in time rather than
on the average values taken over the whole pre-entry period (as in GGK). This allows us to take
into account the fact that the degree of financial constraints faced by a firm is time-varying.
A manager who think about expanding his firm activities abroad can decide to delay the firm
entry into export markets if the firm is financially constrained. This manager could find rational
to wait until the financial constraints of the firms have been lessened to start exporting. In such
a scenario, averaging the financial constraints index of the firm over the whole pre-entry period
could lead to misleading results.
4.3 The decision to start exporting
In this section, we ask if among the today non exporting firms, the ones which will decide
tomorrow to expand their activity abroad are the less financially constrained ones. In other
words, we investigate the impact of financial variables on the decision to start exporting rather
than on the mere decision to export as it was done in Section 4.1 above. We intervene on
the dependant and explanatory variables in Equation 3: i.e instead of regressing the financial
constraints on the future export status, we regress the future export status on the financial
constraints. Specifically, we use the subsample of Export starters and Never exporters23, and
estimate:
Expdumit = a0 + a2Sizei(t−1) + a3TFPi(t−1) + a4Finconsti(t−1)
+ industry + time+ εit
(4)
where Expdum, Finconst, and TFP are defined as before. In this specification, firm size is
controlled for by its employment (number of hours worked). Results are presented in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 here]
We find that the coefficients on the Financial Constraints indexes are all positive and sig-
nificant in the regressions which investigate the impact of one year lagged financial constraints
index on the decision to start exporting in t. On the other hand, the coefficients lose their sig-
nificance when the financial advantage is estimated 3 year before the entry into export market.
This is consistent with the idea that it is the short-run availability of external finance which is
determinant in the decision to enter for the first time new foreign markets.
4.4 Detecting Ex-post effects
In this section we present an empirical assessment of the extent to which exporting firms benefit
from their activities abroad in terms of access to external finance. Once again we use specifica-
23In this regression, both the continuous exporters and the switchers are excluded
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tions adapted from Bernard and Jensen (1999) to investigate whether firms’ financial constraints
go down after their entry into foreign markets. We examine exporter and non-exporter levels
and growth rates over short and medium intervals for our four measures of measures of Financial
constraints. Specifically, we estimate:
Finconsti,t+s = α+ βExportdumi,t + +γXi,t+s + εi,t (5)
and
∆Finconsti,t/t+s = α+ βExportdumi,t + γXi,t + εi,t (6)
where ∆s identify growth rates between time t and t+ s.
Hence, we test whether after starting to export firms experience a change in their access to
external finance that is not explained by a contemporaneous change in size, profitability and
productivity. Results are presented in tables 7 and 8 below.
[Insert Table 7 here]
[Insert Table 8 here]
We don’t find any evidence to support a beneficial effect of exporting in the position of
the firm vis-a`-vis external investors. In the regression in levels, the estimated coefficients of
the export dummy are positive and significant in the short-run interval only for the leverage
ratio and Score A. On a longer horizon, none of them is significant whatever the measure of
financial constraints. Moreover, when one considers growth rates (instead of the levels) none of
the coefficients on the export dummy is significant.
Here again we performed different robustness checks. Results are robust to the exclusion
of switching firms (see table 10 and 11 in Appendix A). We also replicate the specification
which led GGK to conclude in favor of the presence of ex-post gains. This specification consists
in comparing average levels of the financial constraints indexes 24 instead of comparing those
levels in specific point in time (as in Equation 5), or instead of comparing their growth rates
(as in Equation 6). When implementing the GGK specification on our dataset, we also find
positive and significant ex post effects (see results in 13 of Appendix B). However, our preferred
specification remains the ones implemented in this section. Indeed, in the case where Export
starters are already financially advantaged before starting to export, the GGK specification
does not allow to investigate whether exporting involves additional gains in terms of financial
health. Only a test of the change in the financial constraints indexes as performed in Equation
6 can support the hypothesis of ex-post benefit25.
24the average is computed over 3 to 4 years after the entry into export markets
25And even so, the test is still inconclusive. Indeed, suppose there is a firm that experiences favorable shocks
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the link between financial constraints and firms’ export decisions.
We used different measures of financial constraints that take into account the complex nature of
this phenomenon. The literature presents two different views of the relationship between export
and financial constraints: one stresses the fact that constrained firms will not be able to afford
the up-front costs associated with entry into a new market, the other suggests that exporting
act as a signalling device and therefore exporting firms will benefit from a better access to
external financial funds. In this paper, we presented an attempt to discriminate among the
self-selection and the signalling or diversification benefit hypotheses based on a large panel of
French manufacturing firms. Our main finding is that ‘self-selection’ occurs: among all today
non exporters, only less constrained firms decide to start exporting in the next one to three
years. On the contrary, we do not find significant evidence that firms becoming exporters do not
experience a reduction in their constraint as a consequence of exporting. All in all, we conclude
that our data support the recent models of firm’s heterogeneity and international trade which
emphasize self-selection into export markets in a context of financial market imperfections. In
those models, public intervention can be called for to help efficient but financially constrained
firms to overcome the sunk entry costs into export markets and expand their activities abroad.
In this perspective, our results can be seen as justifying the export promotion policies which
have flourished in most of the industrialized countries since the late of the 1990s and early 2000s
and which mainly consist in helping small and medium size firms to overcome the fixed entry
costs into export markets.
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Appendix A: Self selection and ex-post effects: results without
switchers
In this appendix, we present the results of regressions run of a sample of firms which excludes
switching firms. We present both the self-selection equation (Specification 3 in section 4.2) and
the ex-post equations both in levels and in growth rates (Specifications 5 and 6 in section 4.4))
[Insert Table 9 here]
[Insert Table 10 here]
[Insert Table 11 here]
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Appendix B: A replication of Greenaway et al. (2007)
The specifications implemented by GGK also borrow from Bernard and Jensen (1999). In order
to test the self-selection hypothesis, one needs to consider only the group of firms which export
in the final year t = T of a given period of time [0;T ]. This period is alternatively the entire time
period 1996-2004 or subperiods, 1996–2000 and 2001–2004. All other firms are then dropped
form the sample expect the ones which never exports within the whole period [0;T ]. This later
group is the control group. We next perform a test based on the average values of the financial
constraints measure for both groups of firms over the period [0;T − 1] and investigate whether
those values differ in favor of the group of Export starters. Specifically, we estimate:
1
T − 1
T−1∑
0
lnXi,t = α+ βExportdumiT + δDi + γSizei,0 + εit (7)
where Di is a set of Industry dummies and Size a variable which control for the firm’ initial
size, measured in terms of employment(number of hours worked). The results are displayed in
table 12.
[Insert Table 12 here]
Concerning the test of the presence of ex-post effects, the specification requires to consider
the group of firms which start to export in the initial year t = 0 of a given period of time
[0;T ]. This period is alternatively the entire time period 1996-2004 or subperiods, 1996-2000
and 2001-2004. All other firms are then dropped from the sample except the ones which never
export within the whole period [0;T ]. This later group is the control group. The test consists
in comparing the average values of the financial constraints levels for both groups of firms over
the period [1;T ] and in investigating whether those levels differ in favor of the group of Export
starters 26.
1
T − 1
T∑
1
lnXi,t = α+ βExportdumi0 + δDi + γSizei,0 + εit (8)
where Di and Size are defined as before. The results are displayed in table 13.
[Insert Table 13 here]
26Note that, when the test is performed on the entire period, it is as if continuous exporters were compared to
their never exporting counterparts.
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Table 1: Correlations between Financial Constraints indexes
Pearson’s r and Spearman Rho Correlation Coefficient
Liquidity ratio Leverage ratio Score A Score B
Liquidity ratio 1 -0,90 0,50 0,45
Leverage ratio -0,92 1 -0,55 -0,49
Score A 0,46 -0,46 1 0,90
Score B 0,41 -0,41 0,90 1
Numbers in italics denote Spearman rho correlation coefficient
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Continuous Exporters
variable obs mean std. dev. min max
Liquidity ratio 43858 0,324 0,275 -3,66 1,00
Leverage ratio 43858 0,598 0,377 0 9,01
Score A 43858 5,747 1,776 0 10
Score B 43858 6,925 2,410 0 10
log Employ 43858 11,573 0,812 10,32 14,88
log TFP 43858 0,034 0,155 -1,42 1,16
Export Starters
variable obs mean std. dev. min max
Liquidity ratio 7113 0,271 0,276 -1,75 0,98
Leverage ratio 7113 0,670 0,392 0 7,18
Score A 7113 5,460 1,836 0 10
Score B 7113 6,598 2,551 0 10
log Employ 7113 11,198 0,626 10,32 17,47
log TFP 7113 0,021 0,163 -1,18 1,29
Never Exporters
variable obs mean std. dev. min max
Liquidity ratio 10583 0,254 0,312 -1,98 1
Leverage ratio 10583 0,706 0,480 0 7,64
Score A 10583 5,333 1,853 0 10
Score B 10583 6,520 2,551 0 10
log Employ 10583 11,082 0,610 10,32 14,94
log TFP 10583 0,012 0,175 -1,60 1,53
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